This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.
Introduction
This paper studies the problem of implementing efficient allocations in economies with externalities. In these environments, it is well known that competitive equilibrium fails to be Pareto efficient. Pigou~1920! proposed solving this problem by establishing a tax system~called Pigouvian taxes! in such a way that when agents are price and tax takers a Pareto efficient allocation is attained. 1 In this paper we present two "simple" mechanisms that implement, even for linear economies, the PSCC for different equilibrium concepts.
The first mechanism implements the PSCC in strong Nash equilibria. An important difference between Varian's mechanism and ours is that output is not decided by a single individual. As we will see in Examples 2.8 and 2.9, the reason that Pareto inefficient allocations can be supported by SPE in Varian's compensation mechanism is that output is decided by a single individual. In order to avoid this problem, our mechanism determines the output level through the interaction of all agents. In order to interpret this procedure, let us think of the level of externality as pollution. The quantity of pollution must equal the quantity of pollution permits, which are determined by the interaction of all agents. Assuming that the quantity of pollution can be monitored without cost, and that pollution and output are in fixed proportions, it follows that output is~indi-rectly! determined by the quantity of pollution permits. 2 In the case considered in this paper, Pigouvian taxes can be interpreted as Lindahl prices of the pollution. Therefore, a Pigouvian equilibrium can be seen as a Lindahl equilibrium. Nakamura~1988! presents a feasible and continuous mechanism~at the cost of the simplicity of the mechanism! implementing Pigouvian allocations in Nash equilibria but not in strong equilibria. Walker~1981! presents a mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibria but not in strong equilibria. Peleg~1996! presents a mechanism implementing the Lindahl correspondence in Nash and strong equilibria for the case in which all strategically active agents have strictly increasing preferences in all goods. In our model, agent 0 has strictly increasing preferences in the public good but preferences for the rest of the agents are strictly decreasing in this good. Thus, Peleg's mechanism cannot be directly applied to our framework.
The second mechanism doubly implements the PSCC in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. This mechanism is more complicated than the first one but it has the additional advantage that implementation occurs in both Nash and strong Nash equilibria. Therefore, the implementation of the desired result does not depend on the possibilities of coalition formation.
The two mechanisms are simple. Agents announce allocations and prices, and the mechanisms mimic the role of competitive markets. The first mechanism is continuous but there are Nash equilibria yielding allocations that are not Pareto efficient. The second mechanism is discontinuous but it can be made continuous at the cost of complicating the mechanism. Thus, the trade-off between the two mechanisms is that of simplicity versus robustness of the equilibrium concept.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Implementation of Pigouvian SCC in strong Nash equilibria using a continuous mechanism is reported in Section 3. Section 4 presents a mechanism that doubly implements the Pigouvian SCC in Nash and strong Nash equilibria.
The Model
Let us consider the following externality problem involving n ϩ 1 agents. Let I ϭ $0,1, . . . , n% be the set of agents. Agent 0 consumes q units of a good generating an external effect on the other agents. Agents' preferences are representable by a utility function, u i , which depends on two variables. The first one, T i ʦ R, plays the role of~a transfer of ! numér-aire, 3 whereas the second, q ʦ R ϩ , measures the consumption of the good that generates the externality. For simplicity, we assume that each u i is quasilinear, but all of our results are still valid in the case of nonquasilinear utility functions. Thus, agent i's utility function can be expressed as
where v i is concave, strictly increasing for agent 0, and strictly decreasing for the other agents. 4 Alternatively, for interpretative convenience, we may write T i ϭ t i q. In such a case, t i is interpreted as a per-unit tax. An economy is a list e ϭ~u 0 ,u 1 ,..,u n !. Let E denote the set of all admissible economies. Given an economy e, we say that an allocation z ϭ~T 0 ,T 1 ,...,T n ,q! is feasible for e if q ʦ R ϩ and ( iʦI T i ϭ 0. Let Z denote the set of all feasible allocations. In order to simplify notation, we extend preferences and utility functions! over allocations in the following way. We say that agent i weakly prefers allocation z ϭ~T 0 , . . . ,T n ,q! to z
In this case, we will also write u i~z ! ≥ u i~z ' !. The properties we introduce next are minimal conditions that should be satisfied by any solution to be considered satisfactory. The minimal requirements for an allocation are 1. Pareto efficiency. Given an economy e, we say that a feasible allocation z is efficient if there is no feasible allocation z ' that is weakly preferred to z by all the individuals, and strictly preferred by at least one of the agents. That is, z ʦ Z is Pareto efficient if there is no z ' ʦ Z such that, u i~z ' ! ≥ u i~z ! for all i ʦ I, and u j~z ' ! Ͼ u j~z ! for some j ʦ I. 2. Individual rationality. Given an economy e, we say that a feasible allocation z is individually rational if it yields no fewer payoffs to all agents than the allocation where neither exchange nor production occurs. An allocation z ʦ Z is individually rational whenever u i~z ! ≥ u i~0 ,0! for all i ʦ I.
We are interested in social choice correspondences satisfying these two minimal conditions. It is well known that, in a competitive equilibrium, the level of output chosen by agent 0 fails to be Pareto efficient and individually rational. Pigou~1920! pointed out a solution to this problemintervention by a regulator who imposes a tax system. The idea of establishing a tax system to solve the problem of externalities is credited to Pigou; however, he did not address the problem of distributing the income generated by these taxes.
and an output q * ʦ R ϩ such that both of the following hold:
Note that the quantity q may be interpreted as a public good produced by a firm~agent 0! and paid by all agents. The only difference with the standard public good case is that utility functions of agents 1 to n are decreasing on q. In such a case, given an economy e ϭ~u 0 ,u 1 ,..,u n ! ʦ E, t i is agent i's individualized price of the public good, and condition 2 in Definition 2.1 represents the usual way of defining the price at which the firm sells the public good.
The PSCC has good properties. For instance, it is Pareto efficient and individually rational. However, in many cases the regulator does not have access to the information needed to compute the Pigouvian taxes. This is where implementation theory comes into the picture. The following concepts are standard in the literature. DEFINITION 2.2: A mechanism G, is a list of strategy spaces, M ϭ~M i ! iʦI , and an outcome function, f :
Given e ϭ~u 0 ,u 1 ,..,u n ! ʦ E, let~G, e! denote a normal form game. Let x be an equilibrium concept~i.e., Nash equilibrium, etc.! and x~G, e! be the set of x-equilibria of the game~G, e!. In this paper we focus our attention on Nash and strong Nash equilibria. 
. , m n ! ʦ M is a strong Nash equilibrium of the game~G, e! if there is no S ʕ I and m S
' ʦ ϫ iʦS M i , satisfying u i~f~m S ' , m ϪS !! . u i~f~m S , m ϪS !! for all i ʦ S
. Let S~G, e! be the set of strong Nash equilibria of the game~G, e!.

DEFINITION 2.5:
The mechanism G implements the PSCC f P : E r R n ϫ R ϩ in x-equilibrium if for all e ʦ E with x~G, e! л, f~x~G, e!! ϭ f P~e !.
Let x and x
' be two concepts of equilibrium, and x~G, e!~respectively, x '~G , e!! be the set of x-equilibria~respectively, x ' -equilibria! of the gamẽ G, e!. DEFINITION 2.6: The mechanism G doubly implements the PSCC f P : E r R n ϫ R ϩ in x-equilibrium and x ' -equilibrium if for all e ʦ E with x~G,e! л, and x '~G , e! л, f~x~G, e!! ϭ f~x '~G , e!! ϭ f P~e !.
Let us introduce Varian's~1994! compensation mechanism for the two agents case. 
The parameter a Ͼ 0 is of arbitrary magnitude. Agent 0 selects the level of output q.
Thus, both individuals simultaneously select Pigouvian taxes at the first stage and agent 0 selects the output level at the second stage. Variañ 1994! shows that this mechanism implements in SPE the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence when agents' preferences are strictly convex. However, we provide two examples which show that Varian's results are only valid when preferences are convex but not strictly convex.
Example 2.8: Agent 0 has linear preferences~constant returns to scale!.
Consider the following profit functions
* is an SPE of Varian's compensation mechanism yielding the Pigouvian allocation. However, setting
is a subgame perfect equilibrium because agent 0's payoff is identically zero in the second stage.
Example 2.9~Linear externality!:
Consider the following functions
The Pigouvian allocation is q * ϭ @~p ϩ d !0cA#
10~cϪ1! , t 0 * ϭ Ϫt 1 * ϭ Ϫd. Then agent 1's payoff is zero. Note that q * , m 0 ϭ t 1 * , m 1 ϭ t 0 * is an SPE of Varian's compensation mechanism yielding the Pigouvian allocation. However, there are SPE where agent 1 chooses any arbitrary m 1 which yields an undesirable outcome in the second stage! because agent 1 makes zero payoff in the second stage.
We have seen that the compensation mechanism, in the case of economies in which exactly one agent has linear preferences, does not solve the problem of finding a mechanism that implements the Pigouvian SCC. More seriously, coalition formation cannot be considered because an extension of SPE to deal with this possibility does not exist. Thus, we look for new mechanisms in which the problem of coalition formation can be dealt with.
A Continuous Mechanism Implementing the Pigouvian Correspondence in Strong Nash Equilibria
This section presents a simple and continuous mechanism that implements, in strong Nash equilibria, the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence. For the sake of concreteness, think of the classical example of the papermill~agent 0! and the fishermen~agents 1, . . . , n!. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that agents know the damages and profits caused by the papermill output and that they can meet together and discuss the quantity of pollution permits. Let us introduce the mechanism G S that formalizes the rules under which discussions are organized. Let M i ϭ R S the quantity of pollution permits is unanimously decided by all agents and each agent's tax is given by the taxes announced by the others, except when she states a "high" tax~or a "low" subsidy! for herself. A strong Nash equilibrium of the game formed by this mechanism and the payoff functions of each agent yields a self-enforcing agreement that no group of agents would like to renegotiate. 5 We first state a result connecting strong Nash and Nash equilibria for this mechanism. 
Since the transfer received by each agent is larger than before and the level of q is unchanged, all agents will benefit from this deviation. Notice that, when condition~ii! is not satisfied, ( iʦI t i~[ m! is negative. Second, suppose that q~[ m! ϭ 0. Consider the following agents' strategies. For agent 0, K m 0 ϭ~Ϫ( iϭ1 n t i ,q! and for each i ϭ 1, . . . , n, K m i ϭ~( j i t j ,0!, where q and t i , i ϭ 1, . . . , n, are positive real numbers satisfying
Notice that, by construction, all agents prefer the outcome associated with these strategies rather that the equilibrium outcome. A contradiction.
In order to prove the sufficient condition, let [ m be a Nash equilibrium satisfying condition~ii! in Lemma 3.1. Suppose this is not a strong Nash equilibrium, so there is a coalition S ʕ N and strategies 
